Cloudflare Access alternative

The open source, self-hosted alternative to Cloudflare Access

Octelium is a free and open source, self-hosted zero trust access platform. It runs entirely on infrastructure you operate, and provides clientless access to internal applications, client-based access over WireGuard and QUIC, layer-7 aware access control on a per-request basis, and dynamic secretless access.

  • Free and open source
  • Designed for self-hosting

Every request from a human, a browser, a CLI, a workload or an AI agent is authenticated against your identity providers, authorized per request at the application layer by the Octelium Service in front of the resource, exported to your SIEM and observability stack whether it is allowed or denied, and only then routed to the upstream HTTP API, database, SSH server, Kubernetes cluster, LLM or MCP server.

Signing in once, then reaching Services with and without a client

  • A browser opens grafana.acme.com and is redirected to the Cluster sign-in page at acme.com/login.
  • jane signs in with a passkey verified by a biometric on the device, and the browser returns to the Grafana dashboard at grafana.acme.com with no client installed.
  • In a terminal, octelium connect -d opens the browser at acme.com/callback/success/approval, where the same browser session approves the login with one click.
  • ~ ❯ octelium connect -d
  • Please authenticate yourself using Octelium web Portal
  • Waiting for you to approve the login in your browser. Press Ctrl-C to cancel.
  • You are now authenticated as jane
  • Octelium has started running in detached mode.
  • ~ ❯ curl -s my-api/v1/users/42 | jq
  • {
  • "id": 42,
  • "name": "Jane Doe",
  • "email": "jane@acme.com"
  • }
  • ~ ❯ psql -h pg-prod -d shop
  • psql (17.4)
  • Type "help" for help.
  • shop=> SELECT * FROM orders LIMIT 3;
  • id | status | total
  • -----+---------+--------
  • 981 | paid | 129.00
  • 982 | shipped | 48.50
  • 983 | paid | 310.25
  • (3 rows)
  • shop=> \q
  • ~ ❯ ssh bastion
  • Welcome to Ubuntu 24.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.8.0-1021-aws x86_64)

Requests authorized one by one against CEL rules in the HTTP, LLM and Kubernetes modes

  • HTTP: the HTTP Service billing is configured as follows.
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: billing
  • spec:
  • mode: HTTP
  • config:
  • authorization:
  • inlinePolicies:
  • - spec:
  • rules:
  • - effect: ALLOW
  • condition:
  • all:
  • of:
  • - match: '"finance" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - match: ctx.request.http.method == "GET"
  • - match: ctx.request.http.path.startsWith("/invoices")
  • jane, a member of the finance Group, runs curl -i billing/invoices/42 and gets HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"id":42,"status":"paid","total":1290}. The access log records ALLOWED GET /invoices/42 with POLICY_MATCH.
  • jane, a member of the finance Group, runs curl -i -X DELETE billing/invoices/42 and gets HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden X-Octelium-Unauthorized: true Content-Length: 0. The access log records DENIED DELETE /invoices/42 with NO_POLICY_MATCH.
  • LLM: the LLM Service openai is configured as follows.
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: openai
  • spec:
  • mode: LLM
  • config:
  • authorization:
  • inlinePolicies:
  • - spec:
  • rules:
  • - effect: ALLOW
  • condition:
  • any:
  • of:
  • - match: '"ai-admins" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - all:
  • of:
  • - match: '"ai-agents" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - match: ctx.request.llm.operation == "GENERATE"
  • - match: ctx.request.llm.model == "gpt-5-mini"
  • support-bot, a member of the ai-agents Group, runs curl openai/v1/responses --json '{"model":"gpt-5-mini","input":"Hello"}' and gets { "id": "resp_68e8e1f0c4d0", "object": "response", "created_at": 1791628935, "status": "completed", "model": "gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07",. The access log records ALLOWED RESPONSES gpt-5-mini with POLICY_MATCH.
  • support-bot, a member of the ai-agents Group, runs curl openai/v1/responses --json '{"model":"gpt-5","input":"Hello"}' and gets {"error":{"message":"Octelium: unauthorized request","type":"permission_error","param":null,"code":"octelium_unauthorized"}}. The access log records DENIED RESPONSES gpt-5 with NO_POLICY_MATCH.
  • Kubernetes: the KUBERNETES Service k8s-prod is configured as follows.
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: k8s-prod
  • spec:
  • mode: KUBERNETES
  • config:
  • authorization:
  • inlinePolicies:
  • - spec:
  • rules:
  • - effect: ALLOW
  • condition:
  • all:
  • of:
  • - match: '"sre-agents" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - match: ctx.request.kubernetes.verb in ["get", "list"]
  • - match: ctx.request.kubernetes.namespace == "production"
  • - not: ctx.request.kubernetes.resource == "secrets"
  • ops-agent, a member of the sre-agents Group, runs kubectl get configmaps -n production and gets NAME DATA AGE app-config 4 12d feature-flags 2 3d kube-root-ca.crt 1 12d. The access log records ALLOWED list configmaps · production with POLICY_MATCH.
  • ops-agent, a member of the sre-agents Group, runs kubectl get secrets -n production and gets Error from server (Forbidden): Octelium: Unauthorized request. The access log records DENIED list secrets · production with NO_POLICY_MATCH.

Upstream credentials injected per request by identity in the HTTP, SSH and PostgreSQL modes

  • HTTP: the HTTP Service stripe proxies https://api.stripe.com and picks the upstream credential of every request with dynamic configuration rules.
  • elena, a member of the finance-eu Group, runs curl -s stripe/v1/account | jq '{id, country}' without holding any credential. The rule "finance-eu" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the eu config, so Octelium injects the Secret stripe-eu and the upstream authenticates the request as acct_1Pq8EuGmbH2bXvK3. The terminal shows { "id": "acct_1Pq8EuGmbH2bXvK3", "country": "DE" }
  • pay-agent, a member of the finance-us Group, runs curl -s stripe/v1/account | jq '{id, country}' without holding any credential. The rule "finance-us" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the us config, so Octelium injects the Secret stripe-us and the upstream authenticates the request as acct_1Nf2UsQ7cLm4RtW9. The terminal shows { "id": "acct_1Nf2UsQ7cLm4RtW9", "country": "US" }
  • SSH: the SSH Service web-01 proxies ssh://10.0.4.21 and picks the upstream credential of every request with dynamic configuration rules.
  • sam, a member of the sre Group, runs ssh web-01 without holding any credential. The rule "sre" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the root config, so Octelium injects the Secret root-key and the upstream authenticates the request as root. The terminal shows Welcome to Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.14.0-1015-aws x86_64) root@web-01:~# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
  • noah, a member of the developers Group, runs ssh web-01 without holding any credential. The rule "developers" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the deploy config, so Octelium injects the Secret deploy-key and the upstream authenticates the request as deploy. The terminal shows Welcome to Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.14.0-1015-aws x86_64) deploy@web-01:~$ id uid=1001(deploy) gid=1001(deploy) groups=1001(deploy)
  • PostgreSQL: the POSTGRES Service orders-db proxies postgres://10.0.2.8:5432 and picks the upstream credential of every request with dynamic configuration rules.
  • priya, a member of the backend Group, runs psql -h orders-db orders without holding any credential. The rule "backend" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the rw config, so Octelium injects the Secret pg-rw and the upstream authenticates the request as app_rw. The terminal shows psql (17.2) Type "help" for help. orders=> UPDATE orders SET status = 'shipped' WHERE id = 42; UPDATE 1
  • bi-agent, a member of the analytics Group, runs psql -h orders-db orders without holding any credential. The rule "analytics" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the ro config, so Octelium injects the Secret pg-ro and the upstream authenticates the request as app_ro. The terminal shows psql (17.2) Type "help" for help. orders=> UPDATE orders SET status = 'shipped' WHERE id = 42; ERROR: permission denied for table orders

Signing in with a passkey and opening the Portal

  • The sign-in page of the Cluster at acme.com/login offers login with Okta, with GitHub, or with a passkey.
  • jane@acme.com chooses Login with a Passkey and verifies it with a biometric on the device through native WebAuthn.
  • The browser is redirected to the Portal at portal.acme.com/services, which lists the Services the User can access:
  • grafana.monitoring: Grafana dashboards, Web App, Namespace monitoring.
  • aws-postgres.production: Amazon RDS for PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL, Namespace production.
  • k8s-prod: Production EKS cluster, Kubernetes, Namespace default.
  • bastion.production: SSH bastion host, SSH, Namespace production.
  • github-mcp: GitHub MCP server, MCP, Namespace default.
  • openai: OpenAI API, AI / LLM, Namespace default.
Visibility and auditing

Identity-aware visibility at the application layer

Emit structured, application-layer access logs in real time and export them through OpenTelemetry OTLP to the observability, analytics and SIEM systems your organization already operates.

Read about visibility and auditing
AccessLogOTLP
ALLOWjane@acme.comwikiHTTPGET /docs/onboarding 200, browser session
DENYcontractor-3billingHTTPPOST /v1/refunds policy=orders-create
ALLOWci-runnerstripeHTTPGET /v1/charges, credential injected upstream
ALLOWlinus@acme.comcorp-dnsDNSquestion=internal.acme.com type=A
ALLOWagent-07tools-mcpMCPtools/call name=search_docs
Deployment and scale

Self-hosted, Kubernetes-native and fully programmable

Run the Cluster on Kubernetes infrastructure you control, scale the data plane horizontally, manage resources declaratively, automate the platform through APIs and SDKs, and optionally deploy containerized Service upstreams with the Cluster itself.

Read the management guide

Cluster resources applied declaratively from YAML with octeliumctl and managed programmatically with the Go, TypeScript, Python and Rust SDKs

  • GitOps: cluster.yaml in the main branch of the ~/octelium repository describes the desired state of the Cluster. Its diff reads as follows, with + for added, ~ for changed and - for removed lines.
  • + kind: Group
  • + metadata:
  • + name: payments
  • + spec: {}
  • + ---
  • + kind: User
  • + metadata:
  • + name: alice
  • + spec:
  • + type: HUMAN
  • + email: alice@acme.com
  • + groups: ["payments"]
  • ---
  • kind: User
  • metadata:
  • name: bob
  • spec:
  • type: HUMAN
  • ~ groups: ["payments"]
  • ---
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: billing
  • spec:
  • mode: HTTP
  • config:
  • upstream:
  • ~ url: http://10.0.3.24:8080
  • - ---
  • - kind: Service
  • - metadata:
  • - name: billing-legacy
  • - spec: ⋯
  • - ---
  • - kind: User
  • - metadata:
  • - name: john
  • - spec: ⋯
  • ~/octelium ❯ octeliumctl apply --prune .
  • Group: payments Created
  • User: alice Created
  • User: bob Updated
  • Service: billing.default Updated
  • Service: billing-legacy.default Deleted
  • User: john Deleted
  • Cluster Core resources successfully applied
  • 2 resources created
  • 2 resources updated
  • 2 resources deleted
  • Go: main.go uses the octelium-go SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • client, err := octelium.New(ctx)
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • conn, err := client.Conn(ctx)
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • api := corev1.NewMainServiceClient(conn)
  • users, err := api.ListUser(ctx, &corev1.ListUserOptions{})
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • for _, u := range users.Items {
  • fmt.Println(u.Metadata.Name)
  • }
  • user, err := api.GetUser(ctx, &metav1.GetOptions{Name: "linus"})
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • user.Spec.Email = "linus@acme.com"
  • user.Spec.Authorization = &corev1.User_Spec_Authorization{
  • Policies: []string{"db-readonly"},
  • }
  • if _, err := api.UpdateUser(ctx, user); err != nil {⋯}
  • fmt.Println("updated", user.Metadata.Name)
  • ~/app ❯ go run .
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
  • TypeScript: main.ts uses the @octelium/sdk SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • const client = await OcteliumClient.create({
  • domain: "acme.com",
  • auth: {⋯},
  • });
  • const users = await client.coreV1.listUser(ListUserOptions.create());
  • for (const u of users.response.items) {
  • console.log(u.metadata?.name);
  • }
  • const { response: user } = await client.coreV1.getUser(
  • GetOptions.create({ name: "linus" }),
  • );
  • user.spec!.email = "linus@acme.com";
  • user.spec!.authorization = User_Spec_Authorization.create({
  • policies: ["db-readonly"],
  • });
  • await client.coreV1.updateUser(user);
  • console.log("updated", user.metadata?.name);
  • await client.close();
  • ~/app ❯ npx tsx main.ts
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
  • Python: main.py uses the octelium-sdk SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • async with await OcteliumClient.create() as client:
  • users = await client.core_v1.list_user(ListUserOptions())
  • for u in users.items:
  • print(u.metadata.name)
  • user = await client.core_v1.get_user(GetOptions(name="linus"))
  • user.spec.email = "linus@acme.com"
  • user.spec.authorization.policies = ["db-readonly"]
  • await client.core_v1.update_user(user)
  • print("updated", user.metadata.name)
  • ~/app ❯ python main.py
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
  • Rust: main.rs uses the octelium SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • let client = Client::from_env().await?;
  • let mut api = client.core_v1();
  • let users = api.list_user(ListUserOptions::default()).await?;
  • for u in users.into_inner().items {
  • println!("{}", u.metadata.unwrap_or_default().name);
  • }
  • let options = GetOptions {
  • name: "linus".into(),
  • ..Default::default()
  • };
  • let mut user = api.get_user(options).await?.into_inner();
  • let spec = user.spec.get_or_insert_default();
  • spec.email = "linus@acme.com".into();
  • spec.authorization.get_or_insert_default().policies = vec!["db-readonly".into()];
  • let user = api.update_user(user).await?.into_inner();
  • println!("updated {}", user.metadata.unwrap_or_default().name);
  • ~/app ❯ cargo run -q
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
Comparison

Octelium and Cloudflare Access, capability by capability

Both products are compared from the same structured capability dataset and evaluated using the same evidentiary standard. Emerging or experimental capabilities are marked as partial regardless of vendor.

Capability comparison

Dataset reviewed August 2026

This is a curated subset of the full capability matrix, including areas where either product differs and areas where their capabilities are equivalent. Open the complete matrix for every row, source and filter.

Architecture

Architecture

Octelium
Kubernetes-native identity-aware proxy/gateway architecture in which policy evaluation is separated from enforcement, with client-based WireGuard/QUIC access, clientless BeyondCorp access, declarative resources, and self-hosted control/data planes.
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
SaaS edge proxy/SASE architecture. cloudflared connectors and/or WARP clients connect private resources and users to Cloudflare's global network. Access policies apply at Cloudflare-controlled edge/control plane.

Authentication

Native FIDO2 / Passkey

Native means implemented by the platform itself, not merely delegated to an external IdP.

Octelium
NativeFIDO2/Passkey/WebAuthnN with attestation and hardware-resistant authenticator checks
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
NoGenerally delegated to IdP.

Workload Identity

Octelium
OIDC assertions / workload identity
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Service tokens / mTLS / Access apps

Anonymous / Public Access

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

SCIM Provisioning

Automated user/group lifecycle provisioning via SCIM, beyond just login-time IdP federation.

Octelium
SCIM 2.0 compliant
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
SCIM via Access / IdP

Authorization & Policy

Policy Model

Octelium
Layer-7 aware ABAC with policy-as-code via CEL and OPA
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Access rules, geolocation and Gateway policies.

Policy-as-Code

Octelium
CEL + OPA
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Terraform/API; not a CEL/OPA product-native policy runtime

Per-Request Authz

For L7 products, this means each HTTP/gRPC/API/K8s request can be evaluated. For overlays, session/connection policy is not counted as per-request. This modeling choice structurally favors L7 gateways over network overlays.

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
For Access-protected HTTP/MCP/web flows; not equivalent for all private network flows

L7-Aware Policies

Octelium
HTTP, gRPC, K8s, DB, SSH, mTLS-related context
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Strong HTTP/web policy; not DB/K8s query/verb semantics

Zero Standing Privilege / JIT

Indicates strong architectural support for minimizing standing privilege; not an absolute claim that privileged access cannot exist.

Octelium
StrongDesigned to minimize static privilege through identity/policy-scoped access.
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Partial

Access Requests / Approvals

First-class request-and-approve / break-glass workflows (reviewers, time-bound grants), as opposed to static policy alone.

Octelium
Access requests + approvalsFirst-class access request and approval workflow, in addition to policy/identity-scoped access that can be time-bound.
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Policy + approvals via integrations; not a native PAM request workflow

Device Posture

Octelium
TPM/FIDO2/device attributes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Yes

L7 Protocol Awareness & Secretless Access

SSH

Octelium
Secretless / embedded SSH patterns
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Browser/CLI access patterns

PostgreSQL

Octelium
Secretless + query-aware policy/logging
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Private network/proxy connectivity; not query-aware secretless DB gateway

Kubernetes

Octelium
Secretless + verb/resource/namespace policy
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Can protect access paths; not native K8s verb/resource authz gateway

RDP

Octelium
with clientless secretless browser access
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Browser-based RDP and client modes

DNS

Octelium
Native private DNS mode
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Gateway DNS filtering / private networking DNS patterns

Transport & Networking

WireGuard Data Plane

Whether the product's own client/data plane is built on WireGuard, versus a proprietary or TLS-based transport.

Octelium
Kernel / userspaceWireGuard via kernel module, TUN, or unprivileged userspace (wireguard-go) implementations.
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
WARPWARP uses a WireGuard-derived transport (BoringTun) alongside MASQUE/HTTP3; not a standard WireGuard mesh.

Visibility, Auditing & Observability

OpenTelemetry-Native

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

L7-Aware Access Logs

Octelium
HTTP/gRPC/K8s/DB/SSH identity-aware logs
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
HTTP/access/gateway logs; not DB query logs

SSH Session Recording

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

Access Methods

Client-Based VPN / Overlay

Octelium
WireGuard / QUIC
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
WARP client

Clientless Browser Access

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Yes

Workload OAuth2 / Bearer

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Service tokens / Access service auth

Private DNS

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Private DNS/Gateway patterns, not MagicDNS-style product focus

Dynamic Configuration

Dynamic Credential Selection

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

SaaS / Public Cloud API Access

Secretless SaaS API Access

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

AI / MCP / Agent Compatibility

AI / LLM Gateway

Octelium
Native LLM Service modeProtocol-aware OpenAI/Anthropic gateway: validated operations, per-request authorization on model, tools and token limits, CEL-based model selection, and token usage in access logs.
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Workers/AI products exist; Access/Tunnel is not primarily an LLM gateway

MCP Gateway / MCP Access

Octelium
Native MCP Service modeProtocol-aware MCP gateway: JSON-RPC method and tool-level authorization, protocol version pinning, origin validation, and managed-container MCP upstreams.
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Cloudflare Access can protect MCP servers

Deploy Containers / PaaS

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

Scalability & Cloud-Nativeness

High Availability

Octelium
K8s-native HA model
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
Global edge

Openness & Self-Hosting

Fully Self-Hosted

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

Server Code Open Source

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

No Mandatory Proprietary Cloud

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
No

Data Sovereignty

Octelium
Yes
Cloudflare Access / Tunnel
NoTraffic/control plane depend on Cloudflare's network for core workflows.
Questions

Frequently asked

Is Octelium free and open source?
Yes. Octelium is free and open source and is designed for single-tenant self-hosting. There is no proprietary cloud-based control plane and it is not a limited edition of a separate paid product. An enterprise package is available for organizations that need capabilities such as a web console, SCIM provisioning and secret encryption at rest, and it is free for personal, homelab and evaluation use.
Where does my traffic actually terminate?
Inside your own Cluster, on infrastructure you operate, in the regions you choose. Clientless access is served by an internet-facing proxy that is part of your Cluster, and client-based access runs over WireGuard or QUIC tunnels directly to it. There is no third party in the data path and no external control plane deciding whether a request is allowed.
Do I need to open inbound ports for private resources?
No. A resource behind NAT can be served through a connected Octelium client or container running next to it, so nothing has to be exposed and no firewall rule has to be added. Public clientless access is published from the Cluster itself rather than from the network the upstream sits on.
How does clientless access work for workloads?
Workloads reach publicly published Services over HTTPS using the standard OAuth2 client credentials flow or bearer authentication, in any programming language, with no client and no special SDK. Human Users reach the same Services in a browser after authenticating with your identity provider.
Can I publish public websites and APIs with it?
Yes. A Service can be made publicly and anonymously accessible, which turns the Cluster into a hosting platform for upstreams served from anywhere, including containerized applications that the Cluster deploys and scales itself. Anonymous Services can still apply authorization rules over the request path, method, headers and body.
Do I need Kubernetes experience to run Octelium?
No. Octelium runs on Kubernetes, but Kubernetes expertise is not required for a basic deployment. The quick installer provisions a complete single-node Cluster, including Kubernetes, on a fresh Linux VM or server. Larger production deployments can run on managed or on-premises multi-node Kubernetes.
Get started

Run Octelium on your own infrastructure

Install a self-hosted Cluster and start applying identity-aware access control to your Services.