StrongDM alternative

The open source, self-hosted alternative to StrongDM

Octelium is a free and open source, self-hosted zero trust access platform. It provides secretless access to SSH servers, databases and Kubernetes clusters, identity-based and layer-7 aware access control on a per-request basis, and full application-layer auditing, with the control plane and the data plane both running on your own infrastructure.

  • Free and open source
  • Designed for self-hosting
  • SSH, databases and Kubernetes

Every request from a human, a browser, a CLI, a workload or an AI agent is authenticated against your identity providers, authorized per request at the application layer by the Octelium Service in front of the resource, exported to your SIEM and observability stack whether it is allowed or denied, and only then routed to the upstream HTTP API, database, SSH server, Kubernetes cluster, LLM or MCP server.

Signing in once, then reaching Services with and without a client

  • A browser opens grafana.acme.com and is redirected to the Cluster sign-in page at acme.com/login.
  • jane signs in with a passkey verified by a biometric on the device, and the browser returns to the Grafana dashboard at grafana.acme.com with no client installed.
  • In a terminal, octelium connect -d opens the browser at acme.com/callback/success/approval, where the same browser session approves the login with one click.
  • ~ ❯ octelium connect -d
  • Please authenticate yourself using Octelium web Portal
  • Waiting for you to approve the login in your browser. Press Ctrl-C to cancel.
  • You are now authenticated as jane
  • Octelium has started running in detached mode.
  • ~ ❯ curl -s my-api/v1/users/42 | jq
  • {
  • "id": 42,
  • "name": "Jane Doe",
  • "email": "jane@acme.com"
  • }
  • ~ ❯ psql -h pg-prod -d shop
  • psql (17.4)
  • Type "help" for help.
  • shop=> SELECT * FROM orders LIMIT 3;
  • id | status | total
  • -----+---------+--------
  • 981 | paid | 129.00
  • 982 | shipped | 48.50
  • 983 | paid | 310.25
  • (3 rows)
  • shop=> \q
  • ~ ❯ ssh bastion
  • Welcome to Ubuntu 24.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.8.0-1021-aws x86_64)

Requests authorized one by one against CEL rules in the HTTP, LLM and Kubernetes modes

  • HTTP: the HTTP Service billing is configured as follows.
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: billing
  • spec:
  • mode: HTTP
  • config:
  • authorization:
  • inlinePolicies:
  • - spec:
  • rules:
  • - effect: ALLOW
  • condition:
  • all:
  • of:
  • - match: '"finance" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - match: ctx.request.http.method == "GET"
  • - match: ctx.request.http.path.startsWith("/invoices")
  • jane, a member of the finance Group, runs curl -i billing/invoices/42 and gets HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"id":42,"status":"paid","total":1290}. The access log records ALLOWED GET /invoices/42 with POLICY_MATCH.
  • jane, a member of the finance Group, runs curl -i -X DELETE billing/invoices/42 and gets HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden X-Octelium-Unauthorized: true Content-Length: 0. The access log records DENIED DELETE /invoices/42 with NO_POLICY_MATCH.
  • LLM: the LLM Service openai is configured as follows.
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: openai
  • spec:
  • mode: LLM
  • config:
  • authorization:
  • inlinePolicies:
  • - spec:
  • rules:
  • - effect: ALLOW
  • condition:
  • any:
  • of:
  • - match: '"ai-admins" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - all:
  • of:
  • - match: '"ai-agents" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - match: ctx.request.llm.operation == "GENERATE"
  • - match: ctx.request.llm.model == "gpt-5-mini"
  • support-bot, a member of the ai-agents Group, runs curl openai/v1/responses --json '{"model":"gpt-5-mini","input":"Hello"}' and gets { "id": "resp_68e8e1f0c4d0", "object": "response", "created_at": 1791628935, "status": "completed", "model": "gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07",. The access log records ALLOWED RESPONSES gpt-5-mini with POLICY_MATCH.
  • support-bot, a member of the ai-agents Group, runs curl openai/v1/responses --json '{"model":"gpt-5","input":"Hello"}' and gets {"error":{"message":"Octelium: unauthorized request","type":"permission_error","param":null,"code":"octelium_unauthorized"}}. The access log records DENIED RESPONSES gpt-5 with NO_POLICY_MATCH.
  • Kubernetes: the KUBERNETES Service k8s-prod is configured as follows.
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: k8s-prod
  • spec:
  • mode: KUBERNETES
  • config:
  • authorization:
  • inlinePolicies:
  • - spec:
  • rules:
  • - effect: ALLOW
  • condition:
  • all:
  • of:
  • - match: '"sre-agents" in ctx.user.spec.groups'
  • - match: ctx.request.kubernetes.verb in ["get", "list"]
  • - match: ctx.request.kubernetes.namespace == "production"
  • - not: ctx.request.kubernetes.resource == "secrets"
  • ops-agent, a member of the sre-agents Group, runs kubectl get configmaps -n production and gets NAME DATA AGE app-config 4 12d feature-flags 2 3d kube-root-ca.crt 1 12d. The access log records ALLOWED list configmaps · production with POLICY_MATCH.
  • ops-agent, a member of the sre-agents Group, runs kubectl get secrets -n production and gets Error from server (Forbidden): Octelium: Unauthorized request. The access log records DENIED list secrets · production with NO_POLICY_MATCH.

Upstream credentials injected per request by identity in the HTTP, SSH and PostgreSQL modes

  • HTTP: the HTTP Service stripe proxies https://api.stripe.com and picks the upstream credential of every request with dynamic configuration rules.
  • elena, a member of the finance-eu Group, runs curl -s stripe/v1/account | jq '{id, country}' without holding any credential. The rule "finance-eu" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the eu config, so Octelium injects the Secret stripe-eu and the upstream authenticates the request as acct_1Pq8EuGmbH2bXvK3. The terminal shows { "id": "acct_1Pq8EuGmbH2bXvK3", "country": "DE" }
  • pay-agent, a member of the finance-us Group, runs curl -s stripe/v1/account | jq '{id, country}' without holding any credential. The rule "finance-us" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the us config, so Octelium injects the Secret stripe-us and the upstream authenticates the request as acct_1Nf2UsQ7cLm4RtW9. The terminal shows { "id": "acct_1Nf2UsQ7cLm4RtW9", "country": "US" }
  • SSH: the SSH Service web-01 proxies ssh://10.0.4.21 and picks the upstream credential of every request with dynamic configuration rules.
  • sam, a member of the sre Group, runs ssh web-01 without holding any credential. The rule "sre" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the root config, so Octelium injects the Secret root-key and the upstream authenticates the request as root. The terminal shows Welcome to Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.14.0-1015-aws x86_64) root@web-01:~# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
  • noah, a member of the developers Group, runs ssh web-01 without holding any credential. The rule "developers" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the deploy config, so Octelium injects the Secret deploy-key and the upstream authenticates the request as deploy. The terminal shows Welcome to Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.14.0-1015-aws x86_64) deploy@web-01:~$ id uid=1001(deploy) gid=1001(deploy) groups=1001(deploy)
  • PostgreSQL: the POSTGRES Service orders-db proxies postgres://10.0.2.8:5432 and picks the upstream credential of every request with dynamic configuration rules.
  • priya, a member of the backend Group, runs psql -h orders-db orders without holding any credential. The rule "backend" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the rw config, so Octelium injects the Secret pg-rw and the upstream authenticates the request as app_rw. The terminal shows psql (17.2) Type "help" for help. orders=> UPDATE orders SET status = 'shipped' WHERE id = 42; UPDATE 1
  • bi-agent, a member of the analytics Group, runs psql -h orders-db orders without holding any credential. The rule "analytics" in ctx.user.spec.groups selects the ro config, so Octelium injects the Secret pg-ro and the upstream authenticates the request as app_ro. The terminal shows psql (17.2) Type "help" for help. orders=> UPDATE orders SET status = 'shipped' WHERE id = 42; ERROR: permission denied for table orders

Signing in with a passkey and opening the Portal

  • The sign-in page of the Cluster at acme.com/login offers login with Okta, with GitHub, or with a passkey.
  • jane@acme.com chooses Login with a Passkey and verifies it with a biometric on the device through native WebAuthn.
  • The browser is redirected to the Portal at portal.acme.com/services, which lists the Services the User can access:
  • grafana.monitoring: Grafana dashboards, Web App, Namespace monitoring.
  • aws-postgres.production: Amazon RDS for PostgreSQL, PostgreSQL, Namespace production.
  • k8s-prod: Production EKS cluster, Kubernetes, Namespace default.
  • bastion.production: SSH bastion host, SSH, Namespace production.
  • github-mcp: GitHub MCP server, MCP, Namespace default.
  • openai: OpenAI API, AI / LLM, Namespace default.
Visibility and auditing

Session recordings and query-level detail

Emit structured, application-layer access logs in real time and export them through OpenTelemetry OTLP to the observability, analytics and SIEM systems your organization already operates.

Read about visibility and auditing
AccessLogOTLP
ALLOWlinus@acme.compg-prod.dbPOSTGRESquery: select id, email from users limit 50
ALLOWci-runnerprod-k8sKUBERNETESverb=list resource=pods namespace=production
DENYagent-07tools-mcpMCPtools/call name=transfer policy=mcp-tools
ALLOWjane@acme.combastionSSHsession recorded, upstream user=deploy
ALLOWagent-07openaiLLMCHAT_COMPLETIONS model=gpt-5-mini tokens=1284
Deployment and scale

Self-hosted, Kubernetes-native and fully programmable

Run the Cluster on Kubernetes infrastructure you control, scale the data plane horizontally, manage resources declaratively, automate the platform through APIs and SDKs, and optionally deploy containerized Service upstreams with the Cluster itself.

Read the management guide

Cluster resources applied declaratively from YAML with octeliumctl and managed programmatically with the Go, TypeScript, Python and Rust SDKs

  • GitOps: cluster.yaml in the main branch of the ~/octelium repository describes the desired state of the Cluster. Its diff reads as follows, with + for added, ~ for changed and - for removed lines.
  • + kind: Group
  • + metadata:
  • + name: payments
  • + spec: {}
  • + ---
  • + kind: User
  • + metadata:
  • + name: alice
  • + spec:
  • + type: HUMAN
  • + email: alice@acme.com
  • + groups: ["payments"]
  • ---
  • kind: User
  • metadata:
  • name: bob
  • spec:
  • type: HUMAN
  • ~ groups: ["payments"]
  • ---
  • kind: Service
  • metadata:
  • name: billing
  • spec:
  • mode: HTTP
  • config:
  • upstream:
  • ~ url: http://10.0.3.24:8080
  • - ---
  • - kind: Service
  • - metadata:
  • - name: billing-legacy
  • - spec: ⋯
  • - ---
  • - kind: User
  • - metadata:
  • - name: john
  • - spec: ⋯
  • ~/octelium ❯ octeliumctl apply --prune .
  • Group: payments Created
  • User: alice Created
  • User: bob Updated
  • Service: billing.default Updated
  • Service: billing-legacy.default Deleted
  • User: john Deleted
  • Cluster Core resources successfully applied
  • 2 resources created
  • 2 resources updated
  • 2 resources deleted
  • Go: main.go uses the octelium-go SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • client, err := octelium.New(ctx)
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • conn, err := client.Conn(ctx)
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • api := corev1.NewMainServiceClient(conn)
  • users, err := api.ListUser(ctx, &corev1.ListUserOptions{})
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • for _, u := range users.Items {
  • fmt.Println(u.Metadata.Name)
  • }
  • user, err := api.GetUser(ctx, &metav1.GetOptions{Name: "linus"})
  • if err != nil {⋯}
  • user.Spec.Email = "linus@acme.com"
  • user.Spec.Authorization = &corev1.User_Spec_Authorization{
  • Policies: []string{"db-readonly"},
  • }
  • if _, err := api.UpdateUser(ctx, user); err != nil {⋯}
  • fmt.Println("updated", user.Metadata.Name)
  • ~/app ❯ go run .
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
  • TypeScript: main.ts uses the @octelium/sdk SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • const client = await OcteliumClient.create({
  • domain: "acme.com",
  • auth: {⋯},
  • });
  • const users = await client.coreV1.listUser(ListUserOptions.create());
  • for (const u of users.response.items) {
  • console.log(u.metadata?.name);
  • }
  • const { response: user } = await client.coreV1.getUser(
  • GetOptions.create({ name: "linus" }),
  • );
  • user.spec!.email = "linus@acme.com";
  • user.spec!.authorization = User_Spec_Authorization.create({
  • policies: ["db-readonly"],
  • });
  • await client.coreV1.updateUser(user);
  • console.log("updated", user.metadata?.name);
  • await client.close();
  • ~/app ❯ npx tsx main.ts
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
  • Python: main.py uses the octelium-sdk SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • async with await OcteliumClient.create() as client:
  • users = await client.core_v1.list_user(ListUserOptions())
  • for u in users.items:
  • print(u.metadata.name)
  • user = await client.core_v1.get_user(GetOptions(name="linus"))
  • user.spec.email = "linus@acme.com"
  • user.spec.authorization.policies = ["db-readonly"]
  • await client.core_v1.update_user(user)
  • print("updated", user.metadata.name)
  • ~/app ❯ python main.py
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
  • Rust: main.rs uses the octelium SDK to list the Users of the Cluster and update the email and Policies of linus.
  • let client = Client::from_env().await?;
  • let mut api = client.core_v1();
  • let users = api.list_user(ListUserOptions::default()).await?;
  • for u in users.into_inner().items {
  • println!("{}", u.metadata.unwrap_or_default().name);
  • }
  • let options = GetOptions {
  • name: "linus".into(),
  • ..Default::default()
  • };
  • let mut user = api.get_user(options).await?.into_inner();
  • let spec = user.spec.get_or_insert_default();
  • spec.email = "linus@acme.com".into();
  • spec.authorization.get_or_insert_default().policies = vec!["db-readonly".into()];
  • let user = api.update_user(user).await?.into_inner();
  • println!("updated {}", user.metadata.unwrap_or_default().name);
  • ~/app ❯ cargo run -q
  • alice
  • bob
  • linus
  • updated linus
Comparison

Octelium and StrongDM, capability by capability

Both products are compared from the same structured capability dataset and evaluated using the same evidentiary standard. Emerging or experimental capabilities are marked as partial regardless of vendor.

Capability comparison

Dataset reviewed August 2026

This is a curated subset of the full capability matrix, including areas where either product differs and areas where their capabilities are equivalent. Open the complete matrix for every row, source and filter.

Architecture

Architecture

Octelium
Kubernetes-native identity-aware proxy/gateway architecture in which policy evaluation is separated from enforcement, with client-based WireGuard/QUIC access, clientless BeyondCorp access, declarative resources, and self-hosted control/data planes.
StrongDM
SaaS control plane with customer-deployed gateways/relays. Protocol-aware access broker for databases, servers, Kubernetes, and web apps.

Authentication

Workload Identity

Octelium
OIDC assertions / workload identity
StrongDM
Partial

SCIM Provisioning

Automated user/group lifecycle provisioning via SCIM, beyond just login-time IdP federation.

Octelium
SCIM 2.0 compliant
StrongDM
SCIM / IdP provisioning

Authorization & Policy

Policy Model

Octelium
Layer-7 aware ABAC with policy-as-code via CEL and OPA
StrongDM
RBAC/ABAC, JIT access, privileged access workflows, and runtime authorization concepts.

Policy-as-Code

Octelium
CEL + OPA
StrongDM
Terraform/API

Per-Request Authz

For L7 products, this means each HTTP/gRPC/API/K8s request can be evaluated. For overlays, session/connection policy is not counted as per-request. This modeling choice structurally favors L7 gateways over network overlays.

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
Protocol/action dependent

L7-Aware Policies

Octelium
HTTP, gRPC, K8s, DB, SSH, mTLS-related context
StrongDM
DB/SSH/K8s access and logging patterns

Zero Standing Privilege / JIT

Indicates strong architectural support for minimizing standing privilege; not an absolute claim that privileged access cannot exist.

Octelium
StrongDesigned to minimize static privilege through identity/policy-scoped access.
StrongDM
JIT / Delinea ZSP positioning

Access Requests / Approvals

First-class request-and-approve / break-glass workflows (reviewers, time-bound grants), as opposed to static policy alone.

Octelium
Access requests + approvalsFirst-class access request and approval workflow, in addition to policy/identity-scoped access that can be time-bound.
StrongDM
JIT access requests / approvals

Device Posture

Octelium
TPM/FIDO2/device attributes
StrongDM
Yes

L7 Protocol Awareness & Secretless Access

SSH

Octelium
Secretless / embedded SSH patterns
StrongDM
Server access / recording

PostgreSQL

Octelium
Secretless + query-aware policy/logging
StrongDM
Query logging / DB access

MySQL

Octelium
Secretless + query-aware policy/logging
StrongDM
Query logging / DB access

Kubernetes

Octelium
Secretless + verb/resource/namespace policy
StrongDM
Yes

RDP

Octelium
with clientless secretless browser access
StrongDM
Yes

mTLS / cert injection

Octelium
Secretless mTLS / cert injection
StrongDM
No

Raw TCP / UDP

Octelium
TCP and UDP
StrongDM
TCP-oriented infra protocols

Transport & Networking

WireGuard Data Plane

Whether the product's own client/data plane is built on WireGuard, versus a proprietary or TLS-based transport.

Octelium
Kernel / userspaceWireGuard via kernel module, TUN, or unprivileged userspace (wireguard-go) implementations.
StrongDM
No

Embedded SSH

Platform provides its own SSH server/CA or SSH implementation, rather than only tunneling an external sshd.

Octelium
Secretless embedded SSH
StrongDM
Protocol-aware SSH proxy with recording rather than an embedded SSH CA

NAT Traversal

Octelium
Via GatewaysReaches resources behind NAT through Cluster Gateways; client-to-Gateway path rather than a direct P2P mesh.
StrongDM
PartialGateway/relay broker model, not P2P.

Visibility, Auditing & Observability

OpenTelemetry-Native

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

L7-Aware Access Logs

Octelium
HTTP/gRPC/K8s/DB/SSH identity-aware logs
StrongDM
Yes

SSH Session Recording

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
Yes

Access Methods

Client-Based VPN / Overlay

Octelium
WireGuard / QUIC
StrongDM
No

Clientless Browser Access

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
Web UI/app access; client typically needed for many infra protocols

Private DNS

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

Dynamic Configuration

Dynamic Upstream Routing

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

Dynamic Credential Selection

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
Partial

Secrets Backend Integration

Integration with external secret stores / KMS (e.g. Vault, cloud KMS) or native secretless credential handling.

Octelium
Secretless injectionNative secretless credential injection; credentials managed as Cluster resources.
StrongDM
Secret store / credential management integrations

GitOps / Declarative Config

Octelium
Kubernetes-like resources / YAML
StrongDM
Terraform/API

SaaS / Public Cloud API Access

Secretless SaaS API Access

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

AI / MCP / Agent Compatibility

AI / LLM Gateway

Octelium
Native LLM Service modeProtocol-aware OpenAI/Anthropic gateway: validated operations, per-request authorization on model, tools and token limits, CEL-based model selection, and token usage in access logs.
StrongDM
No

MCP Gateway / MCP Access

Octelium
Native MCP Service modeProtocol-aware MCP gateway: JSON-RPC method and tool-level authorization, protocol version pinning, origin validation, and managed-container MCP upstreams.
StrongDM
No

Deploy Containers / PaaS

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

Scalability & Cloud-Nativeness

Kubernetes-Native

Octelium
Built on Kubernetes
StrongDM
No

Auto Horizontal Scaling

Octelium
PEP/PDP can scale independently
StrongDM
SaaS + gateways

Openness & Self-Hosting

Fully Self-Hosted

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

Server Code Open Source

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

No Mandatory Proprietary Cloud

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No

Data Sovereignty

Octelium
Yes
StrongDM
No
Questions

Frequently asked

Is Octelium free and open source?
Yes. Octelium is designed for self-hosting and does not require a proprietary hosted control plane. The core platform is free and open source. An optional enterprise package adds capabilities for organizations with additional operational, identity-management and security requirements, including the web console, SCIM provisioning and Secret encryption at rest.
Which infrastructure protocols are covered?
SSH, PostgreSQL, MySQL, Kubernetes, HTTP and gRPC, browser-based RDP, DNS, SOCKS5, and generic TCP and UDP for anything else. The application-layer modes give per-request authorization, secretless upstream credentials, dynamic configuration and protocol-aware auditing, while the generic modes authorize at connection time and audit the connection.
Do users ever hold the database password or private key?
No. Upstream credentials are stored in the Cluster as Secrets and injected into the upstream connection once a request has been authorized. That covers SSH passwords and private keys, PostgreSQL and MySQL passwords, kubeconfigs, HTTP API keys and mTLS client certificates. Which credential and which upstream account are used can itself be selected per request from identity and context.
Are sessions recorded?
Yes. SSH Services emit full session recordings alongside exec requests and port forwarding events, with stdin recording available where it is needed and recording disableable per Service. Database, Kubernetes, HTTP, MCP and LLM Services emit their own application-layer entries. Everything is streamed in real time over OpenTelemetry to your own log management and SIEM providers.
How does time-bound access work?
There is no notion of an admin or superuser User, so nothing carries standing privilege by default. Access requests with approvals cover elevation where it is needed, and Policies can be attached to a Service, a Namespace, a User, a Group or a Credential, which makes both the grant and its removal a reviewable configuration change.
Can it SSH into hosts that do not run an SSH server?
Yes. In addition to proxying an existing SSH server, the embedded SSH mode lets a connected client serve SSH from inside the octelium client itself, without a standalone SSH server on the host and without root privileges. That is aimed at fleets of containers, IoT devices and other confined environments where running an SSH server on every host is impractical.
Get started

Run Octelium on your own infrastructure

Install a self-hosted Cluster and start applying identity-aware access control to your Services.